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Representative Democracy and Social Equality
SEAN INGHAM University of California, San Diego, United States
When are inequalities in political power undemocratic, and why? While some writers condemnany inequalities in political power as a deviation from the ideal of democracy, this view isvulnerable to the simple objection that representative democracies concentrate political power in
the hands of elected officials rather than distributing it equally among citizens, but they are no less
democratic for it. Building on recent literature that interprets democracy as part of a broader vision of
social equality, I argue that concentrations of political power are incompatible with democracy, and with a
commitment to social equality more generally, when they consist in some having greater arbitrary power to
influence decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences. A novel account of the relationship
between power and social status clarifies the role of social equality in the justification of democracy,
including a representative democracy in which public officials have more political power than ordinary
citizens.
INTRODUCTION
D emocracy has been justified on the groundsthat it is necessary for realizing a broadervision of social equality, of a society whose
members relate to each other as equals rather than as
occupants of different ranks in a social hierarchy
(Anderson 2009; Christiano 2008; González-Ricoy
and Queralt 2018; Kolodny 2014; 2019; Viehoff 2014;
Wilson 2019). In nondemocratic regimes, privileged
elites rule over the masses or privileged social groups
rule over the marginalized and excluded—some stand
“above” others in a hierarchy. But in a democracy there
are not rulers and subjects, but equal citizens, with
equal opportunities to influence political decisions.
According to some, the equal distribution of political
power is thought to be necessary for realizing the ideal
of social equality, and it is because democracy is
assumed to distribute political power equally—or at
least more equally than alternative regimes—that the
value of social equality is thought to weigh in its favor.
This justification of democracy is vulnerable to an
objection, one with broader implications for how we
understand democracy and political equality. Critics
point out that representative democracies concentrate
decision-making power in the hands of a select few
rather than distributing it equally. What are elections
if not mechanisms for selecting those citizens who will
be given vastly more power to influence political deci-
sions than everyone else? One might describe a certain
kind of idealized direct democracy as distributing pol-
itical power equally, but not a representative democ-
racy. Power cannot be equalized without “destroying
representative government altogether” (Dworkin
2002, 191). If the ideal of social equality requires an
equal distribution of political power, then it would seem
misguided to justify representative democracy as a
means of advancing this ideal.
I present a novel account of the relationship between
political power and social status that explains the role
that the value of social equality can play in the justifi-
cation of representative democracy. What social equal-
ity requires is an equal distribution, not of power per se
but of arbitrary power to influence political decisions
according to one’s idiosyncratic preferences, and this is
what democracy promises, in its electoral form or
otherwise. Elected representatives will necessarily
have more political power than ordinary citizens, but
as representative democracy does not require elected
officials to have any more arbitrary power than anyone
else, it need not run afoul of the ideal of social equality.
Indeed, the value of social equality weighs in its favor
when it is compared with nondemocratic regimes in
which unaccountable rulers enjoy arbitrary power to
decide matters according to their whims. The value of
social equality can also play a role in arguments about
voting rights and the design of democratic institutions:
unequal voting rights, unequal obstacles to exercising
those rights, an undue role for money in politics, or
anything else that produces inequalities in the distribu-
tion of arbitrary, unconstrained power to influence
election outcomes marks a departure from the ideal
of social equality.
While the primary motivation for the argument is a
question about the relationship between social status,
power, and the justification of representative democ-
racy, it has broader implications for how scholars con-
ceptualize political equality. Political scientists
investigating gaps in participation across racial groups
or inequalities in the responsiveness of politicians to
rich and poor citizens, for example, frame their
research as raising questions about the extent to which
existing institutions and policies conform with the val-
ues that are allegedly central to democracy, such as
citizens’ having “equal voice,” equal opportunities for
influence, or equal political power (Jacobs and Skocpol
2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). A typical
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example, from the preamble to a study of the unequal
political influence of rich and poor, is the claim that
“the radical idea at the core of democracy” is that “the
power to shape public policies should be widely and
more or less equally shared among citizens” (Gilens
2012, 12). Such claims must be reconsidered in light of
the simple reductio ad absurdum above, however; in a
representative democracy, the power to shape public
policy is not, and cannot be, equally shared among
citizens. Typical claims about equal voice or equal
political power fail to explain why the inequalities
political scientists investigate—between rich and poor,
or between different racial groups—are objectionable
on democratic grounds. As they are usually formulated,
the claims are crude and overly general, implicating
even the inequality between democratic representa-
tives and ordinary citizens. A more nuanced theory of
what kind of power ought to be equalized in a democ-
racy, and why, is needed. The argument I make here
gives an answer: democratic citizens ought to be equal
in the extent of their arbitrary political power rather
than power per se because this is what is necessary if
they are to become social equals.
THE PROBLEM
Relational egalitarians argue that part of the justifica-
tion for democracy is to be found in the value of social
equality (Anderson 2009; Christiano 2008; González-
Ricoy and Queralt 2018; Kolodny 2014; 2019; Viehoff
2014;Wilson 2019). Social equality refers to the ideal of
“a society in which people are related to one another as
social equals, as opposed to social inferiors or
superiors” (Kolodny 2014, 287). When we consider
paradigmatic examples of hierarchically organized
societies—the American South under Jim Crow,
South Africa under apartheid, for example—they are,
as a rule, societies in which political power is distributed
unequally, with the members of the higher positions in
the social hierarchy enjoying greater political power
than those below. From this observation one might
conclude that inequality in political power contributes
to, or perhaps partly constitutes, inequalities of social
status. One might then argue along the following lines,
as some relational egalitarians have: social equality
requires that individuals enjoy equal opportunities to
influence political decisions (or equal political power,
or equal control over decisions, etc.); democracy pro-
vides equal opportunities for influence (or equal polit-
ical power, etc.), whereas nondemocratic alternatives
do not; thus, democracy is necessary for social equality.
The problem with this argument, however, is that its
second premise does not apply to representative dem-
ocracies, the core institution of which is a mechanism—
elections—for selecting those citizens who will be given
greater opportunities to influence political decisions
than everyone else.1
Kolodny’s explanation for why elected officials
and ordinary citizens can still relate as social equals
is that citizens delegate to the representatives their
special power to influence political decisions, and, in
general, a principal does not make themselves
socially inferior to their agent merely by delegating
power (Kolodny 2014, 317). A client does not make
herself socially inferior to the attorney she hires to
represent her, business owners do not make them-
selves inferior to the managers to whom they dele-
gate responsibilities, etc.
Describing citizens as delegating power is mainly
metaphor, however. An individual voter does not lit-
erally delegate power to their elected representative in
the way a business owner delegates responsibilities to a
manager. If the act of voting for a representative is what
is supposed to count as an act of delegation, then
citizens who have not voted for their representative
have not in this sense delegated any power to them.
Even for citizens who have voted for their representa-
tive, the metaphor of delegation does not explain why
they can relate to each other as social equals. They had
no real choice but to “delegate” powers, in this meta-
phorical sense, either to that candidate or one of the
other candidates on the ballot (if there were any).
Imagine a slave’s owner has died and stipulated in his
will that the slave can choose to “delegate” to any of
several specified “candidates” the package of rights
and powers that constitute ownership of the slave. That
the slave has chosen which of the candidates will be his
new master, and that he could have chosen someone
else to be his master instead, does not change the fact
that he and his newly “elected” owner cannot relate to
each other as social equals. The democratic represen-
tative and ordinary citizen are obviously not in the same
kind of relationship, but the explanation for why they
are not, and for why they can instead relate to each
other as social equals, is not that the citizen has
“chosen” the elected representative, from a limited
slate of candidates, as the person who will exercise
certain powers over her, within an institutional and
legal context where there is no escaping the fact that
someone will exercise those powers over her. That is
also true of the hypothetical slave, and it does not
suffice to make inequalities in power compatible with
social equality.
Another view might be that inequalities in political
power undermine social equality unless they arise
under conditions of equal opportunity, the thought
being that in a representative democracy, at least under
ideal conditions, all citizens have the same opportun-
ities to acquire positions of authority and power.
Depending on how it is disambiguated, however, this
view renders the requirements for social equality either
so permissive that certain nondemocratic regimes sat-
isfy them just as well as representative democracy or so
stringent that these regimes fail to satisfy them, but so
does representative democracy. If equal opportunity
1 Landa and Pevnick (2021b) advance a subtler version of this
critique. An earlier version of their paper inspired this article,



























































































































means equal prospects for equally motivated citizens, it
is implausible that opportunities for holding elected
office could ever be equalized, even under ideal condi-
tions. Not unless “ideal conditions” counterfactualize
the distribution of traits like rhetorical ability, cha-
risma, attractiveness, and other personal traits affecting
the chances of electoral success. If equal opportunities
in this sense were necessary for social equality, then
selecting officeholders through random lotteries might
be a better means of realizing social equality than
elections.2 If what social equality requires is instead
equal opportunities in the sense that “those similarly
endowed and motivated should have roughly the same
chance of attaining positions of political authority”
(Rawls 1971, 224–5), then representative democracy
might satisfy the requirements for social equality
(under ideal conditions), but so will certain alternatives
to democracy. Consider an idealized political meritoc-
racy, in which high-level public officials with the
authority to propose and vote on legislation are
selected through a system of exams and promotion
(Bell 2015). Assume the exams are designed so that
“those similarly endowed and motivated” have
“roughly the same chance of attaining positions of
political authority.” If all social equality requires is
equal opportunities in Rawls’s sense, then it is not a
reason to prefer representative democracy to this kind
of political meritocracy (Landa and Pevnick 2021b).3
The difficulty with this view illustrates a theme. A
justification of representative democracy must identify
reasons to consider it better than the relevant alterna-
tives. Besides political meritocracy, a second alterna-
tive that is of special interest, because of the attention it
has recently received from political theorists, is elect-
oral epistocracy, in which public officials are selected
through elections but the right to vote is granted only to
those who pass a test of competence (Brennan 2016).
Some interpretations of social equality do not identify
reasons for considering representative democracy any
better than these alternative regimes because they
construe the requirements for social equality either
too stringently such that both undemocratic regimes
and representative democracy fail to meet them or too
leniently such that the undemocratic regimes meet the
requirements just as well as representative democracy.
Viehoff (2019), for example, argues that “unequal
distributions of political power need not amount to
objectionable social hierarchy of the sort we associate
with caste or class structures” because hierarchical
social status requires not just differential advantages
according to different social positions, but also a certain
kind of justification. Social hierarchies exist, he argues,
only “where those living in a society cannot reasonably
see how the unequal distribution of advantages could
be given a social justification compatible with every-
one’s equal fundamental moral significance” (Viehoff
2019, 10–9). If that is right, then representation is
compatible with social equality—the inequality
between ordinary citizens and elected representatives
would not constitute a social hierarchy because people
can reasonably see how the inequality in political
power can be given a justification compatible with
everyone’s equal fundamental moral significance. But
it is not clear why the value of social equality would be a
reason to consider democracy better than epistocracy
or political meritocracy. The arguments that Brennan
(2016) gives for epistocracy, or that Bell (2015) gives for
political meritocracy, for example, are compatible with
the assumption that every member of society has equal
moral significance.
Wilson (2019) claims social equality requires not
equal power but equal sharing of political authority, a
condition that is met when everyone’s judgments are
given adequate consideration and that is compatible
with elected officials’ wielding more political power
than ordinary citizens. This view seems to invite a
similar objection, however. With the right cultural
education and socialization, the unelected technocrats
in Bell’s meritocracy, or the “competent” voters in
Brennan’s epistocracy, might be motivated to give
everyone’s judgments equal consideration. Yet, intui-
tively speaking, political meritocracy and epistocracy
undermine social equality even if the politically power-
ful elites in these systems are motivated by an egalitar-
ian, democratic impulse. Of course that supposition
may be unrealistic, but the question is whether it would
suffice for social equality.
Fourie (2012) argues that “evaluation provides a
necessary condition for distinguishing mere differ-
ences, on the one hand, and social inequalities, on the
other,” and claims social inequality arises only when
some people are judged superior to others (Fourie
2012, 113). Applying that idea, one might claim that
nondemocratic institutions create social inequality
because they give public expression to the judgment
that some people are superior to others (Christiano
2008), whereas representative democracy merely cre-
ates differences in power without comparable value
judgments. But that claim is dubious. On one interpret-
ation, the claim might be that inequality in political
power conflicts with social equality if it expresses the
judgment that some people are superior to others with
respect to competence, quality of political judgment, or
other traits and abilities that make one fit for wielding
political power. So understood, epistocracy and polit-
ical meritocracy will conflict with social equality, but so
will representative democracy. Voters can be expected
to make these kinds of evaluative judgments about
candidates for office and to vote accordingly—and
one should hope so, because, in fact, some people are
2 Of course some relational egalitarians might accept this view and
argue, as others have, that lotteries are more democratic than elec-
tions (Guerrero 2014; Landemore 2020; Manin 1997; McCormick
2011). For an argument that the connection between lotteries and
equal opportunity for influence is not so straightforward, see Landa
and Pevnick (2021a).
3 Apart from the difficulties noted in themain text, it is implausible to
suppose that the fairness of the process by which public officials are
selected could suffice for concluding that they and ordinary citizens
can relate to each other as social equals. Anderson (2010, 105) makes
a similar point, asking the reader to “imagine a fair lottery, in which
everyone had an equal chance to be a plantation overseer, with the
losers relegated to gang labor under the overseers’ comprehensive
and arbitrary rule.”

























































































































less competent to hold political office. Indeed, central
to the thinking of the founders of modern representa-
tive democracy was what Manin calls “the principle of
distinction,” the principle that “power be entrusted to
those who possess ‘most wisdom’ and ‘most virtue,’ that
is, to persons who are superior to, and different from,
their fellow citizens” (Manin 1997, 116, emphasis
added). This principle might offend egalitarian sens-
ibilities if it is paired with elitist assumptions about the
social groups where political virtue is most likely to be
found, as it was historically. But once it is unburdened
by its historical association with other forms of elitism,
it is just a benign statement of a view that any voter
implicitly accepts when they vote on the basis of judg-
ments about candidates’ competence.
On a less demanding interpretation, the claimmight
be that judgments of superiority along certain dimen-
sions are compatible with social equality so long as
they do not become judgments that one person’s
interests or claims are more important than
another’s.4 Two people can presumably regard each
other as social equals even if one of them is judged to
have greater skill in some domain, such as cooking,
art, or music. Analogously, one might claim the
elected official and ordinary citizen can regard each
other as social equals even if the official’s superior skill
at drafting and evaluating public policy is publicly
acknowledged, so long as this judgment of superiority
does not become the basis for the judgment that the
official’s interests deserve greater consideration than
anyone else’s. However, this less demanding version
of the view leaves it unclear why epistocracy or polit-
ical meritocracy should be incompatible with social
equality. Those regimes may give public expression to
the judgment that some people have greater skill at
evaluating public policies, but that judgment does not
imply anyone’s interests or claims are more important
than anyone else’s. Admittedly, in a society with a
history of disenfranchising marginalized populations
out of indifference to their interests, support for
democratic rights might be a way to express egalitar-
ian attitudes; the rights might become a symbol of the
value society attributes to each citizen’s claims. But, as
Brennan argues, appeals to symbolism are a shaky
foundation for a justification of democracy: if every-
one came to believe that epistocracy produces more
equitable results than democracy, then presumably
public support for epistocracy could be a way to
express one’s commitment to equality (Brennan
2016, 129).5
The argument I make below differs from previous
views in two important respects. First, on the account I
propose, inequalities in (arbitrary) power can produce
status inequalities independently of how those with
greater power choose to exercise their power and
independently of the moral beliefs and attitudes they
hold. The argument explains why a political meritoc-
racy or epistocracy falls short of the ideal of social
equality even if the unelected technocrats or selectively
enfranchised voters are motivated by an egalitarian
ethos to give adequate consideration to everyone’s
judgments. Second, the argument does not rest on
any claim about what political rights express or sym-
bolize. Like wealth, political rights affect one’s social
status independently of what they symbolize. Thus
Brennan’s criticism does not apply. I say more about
each point below.
POWER AND SOCIAL STATUS
I will start by specifying the sense in which elected
representatives have more power to influence political
decisions than ordinary citizens. After doing so, it will
be easier to identify the reasonswhy equalizing political
power—in that sense—is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for social equality and indeed is not the contribu-
tion that democracy might make toward the realization
of social equality. These reasons will then point us
toward the significance of equalizing citizens’ arbitrary
power to influence decisions.
Within the large literature on the concept of power, a
family of views develops the idea that power is “the
ability to effect something” (Morris 2002). In the con-
text of voting, however, it is rare that anyone can
deterministically cause one decision rather than
another to be taken—in a large election, it almost never
happens that anyone’s vote is pivotal. To generalize the
power-as-ability notion to this context, we can follow an
approach from the voting power literature and take an
agent’s power to be equivalent to their ability to influ-
ence the probabilities of outcomes.
To illustrate, take a situation in which a political
decision is to be made, such as whether to approve or
4 One might formulate a similar view using Lippert-Rasmussen’s
(2018, 64–5) distinction between individuals’ relating to each other
as “moral equals” versus relating to each other as “social equals” and
claim that what justifies democracy is the value of the first kind of
relational equality, not the second. The problem, parallel to the
problem in the main text, is that while the hierarchies in representa-
tive democracy are surely compatible with elected officials and
ordinary citizens relating to each other as moral equals, so are the
hierarchies in nondemocratic versions of political meritocracy or
epistocracy. But if the latter hierarchies are incompatible with offi-
cials and citizens relating to each other social equals, it remains to be
explained why the same cannot be said of the power inequalities in
representative democracy.
5 Gonazález-Ricoy andQueralt (2018, 619–20) respond to Brennan’s
criticism by claiming that political liberties confer equal status not by
virtue of a contingent social convention or cultural symbolism but
because they bestow “pervasive, coercive, inescapable, monopolistic,
and final” power on their holders. However, they do not explain why
these features of political power have implications for social status, or
why the same features of elected representatives’ power fail to make
them the social superiors of ordinary citizens. Note that elected
representatives’ power is no more “monopolistic” than the bureau-
crats’ power in political meritocracy; in each case everyone is eligible
to compete for it (via elections or exams as the case may be).
Christiano (2008) makes the stronger claim that “the disenfranchise-
ment of a group cannot but be seen as a public treatment of that group
as inferiors” (92), for reasons that are independent of a society’s



























































































































reject a piece of proposed legislation or an election
between two parties.6 Individuals can choose from
various plans of action—whether and how to speak
with others about the decision, how to vote, and so on
—or what in game theory are called strategies. The
outcome of the decision-making process depends on
individuals’ chosen strategies. To assess an agent’s
power, we adopt the perspective of a hypothetical
observer who is uncertain about the strategies other
people will choose and represent this uncertainty with a
probability distribution over the various possible com-
binations of other individuals’ strategies.7 An agent has
the power to influence the decision if, by choosing one
plan of action rather than another, the agent’s choice
makes a difference to the probabilities of the outcomes.
A reasonable measure of the amount of the agent’s
power is themaximumdifference the agent’s choice can
make.
Voting. Three individuals, A, B, and C, are voting by
majority rule on whether to approve a proposal. Each
person’s possible plans of action are to vote to approve
or vote to reject the proposal. Taking the perspective of a
hypothetical observer who believes B and C each vote
with equal probability for either option and each vote
independently of the other, the probability that the group
votes to approve ifA votes for approval is 3/4, whereas the
probability that the group votes to approve if she votes to
reject the proposal is only 1/4. Thus the amount of A’s
power to influence the decision is 1/2.
In this scenario, the amount of an individual’s power
coincides with the probability the voter’s ballot is piv-
otal, which is the Banzhaf measure of voting power
(Banzhaf 1965; 1966; Penrose 1946). The Banzhaf
measure is essentially equivalent to Kolodny’s charac-
terization of “contributory influence” over decisions:
My view is that by X-ing, I exercise equal contributory
influence over a decision just when my X-ing has equal a
priori chances of being decisive over the decision, that is,
has equal chances of being decisive on the assumption that
no pattern of X-ing by others is more likely than any other
pattern. (Kolodny 2014, 320–1)
For another illustration, onemight suppose the plans of
action available to A are not just different voting
strategies but more complicated strategies involving
communication as well as voting. Her power may
derive not simply from her voting power but from her
ability to persuadeB andC to vote one way rather than
another, for example.
There are other ways to conceptualize an agent’s
power to influence a collective decision, but this
account suffices for my purposes, as it captures the
assumption underlying the objection to relational-
egalitarian justifications of representative democracy.
By voting for a legislative proposal, instead of against,
an elected representative makes an appreciable differ-
ence to the probability that the proposal is approved.
For a typical ordinary citizen, the citizen’s choicesmake
almost zero difference to the probability the proposal is
approved. If inequalities in political power were con-
stitutive of social hierarchy, then relational egalitarians
would have to object to representative democracy.
Equal power to influence political decisions is nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for social equality, how-
ever. To see its insufficiency, consider the following
hypothetical scenario:
Voter persecution. A voter has the legal right to cast a
ballot in the upcoming election and the ability to exercise
his right—no one will interfere with his attempt to go to
the polling station and cast a ballot, and his ballot will be
counted faithfully, just the same as anyone else’s. How-
ever, well-armed racist goons wait outside the polling
station and announce their intention to beat up the voter
if he votes. They have followed through on similar threats
in the past. The local officers of the state and courts
encourage their terrorism. The voter is, for good reason,
certain they will carry out the threat if he votes.
By stipulation, the thugs will not interfere with the
voter’s attempt to cast a ballot: they intervene only
after the voter has voted, and their intervention does
not stop the voter’s ballot from being recorded and
counted faithfully with every other voter’s. The voter
thus retains the power to influence the election out-
come by voting: the probabilities of the possible elec-
tion outcomes are different depending on whether the
voter chooses to stay home or turn out and vote.
Moreover, the amount of the persecuted voter’s power
to influence the election outcome is unaffected by the
fact of persecution: the amount of power is just the
magnitude of the difference the voter’s action makes to
the probabilities of the possible election outcomes. The
conditions described by Voter persecution are thus
compatible with a world in which all citizens have equal
power to influence election outcomes.
One might resist this claim, as it would be natural to
describe the threats of violence as “disempowering” the
voter, but one should not get hung up on the disagree-
ment. However one describes it, the fact is that in the
hypothetical scenario, both persecuted and nonperse-
cuted voters have an ability to make a difference, of the
same magnitude, to the probabilities of the possible
election outcomes—they have equal Banzhaf power,
what Kolodny calls “equal contributory influence,” and
what by our definition is called equal power to influ-
ence the election.Whatever one calls it, the substantive
point is that their equality in that respect does not
6 I restrict attention to binary decisions in order to bracket compli-
cations that are tangential to the argument. See Sher (2020) for a
measure of voting power that extends to elections withmore than two
alternatives.
7 One approach in the voting power literature is to posit a probability
distribution that puts equal weight on all combinations of other
individuals’ plans of action, but this is not the only approach
(Abizadeh 2021; Felsenthal andMachover 1998; Laruelle and Valen-
ciano 2005). The potential disagreements about this issue are orthog-
onal to the argument I wish to make because on any reasonable
resolution of those issues the conclusion must be that elected repre-
sentatives have greater power to influence political decisions than
ordinary citizens do.

























































































































suffice for social equality. Not when the ability (power)
of some citizens is severely constrained by the fear of
retaliatory violence while other citizens can exercise
their ability (power) as they please, without fear.
Equal power to influence decisions is not only insuf-
ficient but also unnecessary for social equality.
Workers’ cooperative. The members of a workers’
cooperative appoint one of their own to act as a manager,
empowering her to make various decisions about how to
assign tasks, fill vacant positions, and coordinate activities
among the workers. She alone has the power to make
these decisions. At the end of the year her decision-
making will be reviewed and judged by clearly defined
and commonly known criteria, and she will be held
accountable: if her decision-making fails to meet the
accepted criteria, she will lose not only her managerial
position but also her membership in the cooperative.
Given the reliability with which this sanction is applied,
it is common knowledge among the workers that the
manager will make decisions according to the prescribed
criteria, even when she might have conflicting goals, such
as a desire to allocate coveted positions to her friends over
more qualified workers, for example.
In this situation, there is unequal power to influence the
decisions delegated to the manager—she makes these
decisions unilaterally. Nonetheless, this inequality need
not contribute to any social hierarchy within the
cooperative. Given the assumptions about how clearly
defined the criteria are and the manager’s incentives,
everyone knows she is merely executing the decision
algorithm the workers have prescribed for her rather
than acting on her own preferences, such as her pref-
erence for a friend to receive a coveted position. If the
managerial position does not come with special pay or
privileges, there is no reason to think its occupant
would acquire a higher social status than anyone else.
The claim that social equality is compatible with the
conditions in Workers’ cooperative but not Voter per-
secution, is, I assume, intuitively plausible, and the
hypothetical scenarios suggest considerations that
might justify it.What seems tomatter for social equality
is not who has the power to influence decisions per se
but rather who has unconstrained power, and whose
power is constrained, and how. In Workers’ coopera-
tive, the manager’s power is constrained; she must
exercise her power according to the accepted criteria
or lose her source of income. In Voter persecution, the
persecuted and nonpersecuted voters alike have power
to influence the election outcome, but for the first
group their power is severely constrained by the fear
of retaliatory violence. Indeed, the constraint facing the
persecuted voters is so severe it is “as if” they are
powerless; the means by which they could influence
the election outcome are so costly that they might as
well not have any power, for all practical purposes.
(Thismay be the reason some readers chafe at the claim
that the persecuted and nonpersecuted voters have
equal amounts of power to influence the election.)
Every actor faces constraints that prevent them from
fully realizing their multiple competing goals at the
same time. That the manager is prevented from fully
realizing two goals at the same time (keeping her job
and rewarding her friend) does not distinguish her
situation from the generic one. But the constraints on
her power are socially significant in a way generic
constraints are not. They suffice to create a common
expectation among the workers that the manager will
not intentionally deviate from the prescribed criteria,
whatever her personal sympathies and feelings for
other workers or her emotional states more generally;
whatever idiosyncratic values, preferences, or tastes
she may have; and irrespective of whether she stands
to benefit personally from the decisions she makes.
Because it will be useful to have a label for strategies
in which the agent’s exercise of power is independent of
these kinds of personal attitudes, values, interests, and
preferences, I will refer to them as “impersonal” strat-
egies.
When the constraints on an agent’s power suffice to
produce a shared expectation that the agent will adopt
an impersonal strategy, I will say the agent’s power is
adequately constrained. If it is not adequately con-
strained, I will say it is arbitrary.8 I should emphasize
that these labels are not intended to convey any nor-
mative assessment of the agent’s power: to describe an
agent’s power as arbitrary, in this sense, is not neces-
sarily to express criticism or complaint. In some cases
an agent’s power ought to be arbitrary. The persecuted
citizen’s power is “adequately constrained,” even
though the practices producing the constraints are
morally objectionable. The constraint on their power
creates a common expectation that they will choose to
abstain from voting, whatever their preferences over
the candidates might be. That they are so constrained
reflects not just a violation of principles of justice and
morality but also democracy. Democratic voters ought
not to suffer this kind of persecution.When they are not
persecuted in this way and they can cast a secret ballot
and enjoy the normal panoply of rights and protections
we associate with democracy, they have arbitrary
power to influence election outcomes. They can vote
for whichever candidate they like, using any criteria
they like, without suffering any consequences; how a
voter will exercise her power depends on her prefer-
ences, opinions, values, and other idiosyncratic facts
about her attitudes. For any given voter, there are no
constraints producing a common expectation about
whether and how they will choose to vote.
Why should the presence or absence of such con-
straints matter for social equality? Kolodny suggests
social inequality has to do with “some having attributes
(for example, race, lineage, wealth, perceived divine
favor) that generally attract greater consideration than
the corresponding attributes of others” (Kolodny 2014,
295). The term consideration refers in this context to
8 This concept of arbitrary power is similar to concepts traveling
under the same name in the literature on republicanism (Ingham and
Lovett 2019; Laborde 2008; Lovett 2010; Pettit 1997; 2012; Skinner
1998). My definition is not intended to pick out just the same concept
republicans have in mind, although there may be significant overlap


























































































































“those responses that social superiors, as social super-
iors, characteristically attract,” such as “deference,
courtesy, a willingness to serve the interests of or to
fulfill the claims or commands of, efforts to ingratiate or
curry favor with, and so on.” Amending slightly
Kolodny’s claim, I will assume differences in social
status are constituted, partly, by some but not all people
having attributes that, as a matter of common aware-
ness, incentivize others to give them special consider-
ation, such as to ingratiate themselves with them and to
be especially solicitous of their wishes, or by some but
not all people lacking attributes that, as a matter of
common awareness, incentivize courtesy and respect.
As shorthand, I will refer to the attributes that satisfy
this condition as the bases for unequal status. The claim
is that differences in such attributes imply, all else being
equal, differences in social status. (We have to add a
ceteris paribus clause because one person could be, say,
wealthier than a second, yet still of lower status because
of differences in bases for unequal status other than
wealth.) Let me clarify the two amendments I am
making to Kolodny’s claim before returning to the
question about constrained versus arbitrary power.
First, for high status it is not enough that a person’s
attributes attract special consideration; there must also
be a shared awareness of this dynamic among those for
whom the person has high status. A person’s status is a
public fact about them: one cannot coherently imagine
someone secretly having a high status within a group
unbeknownst to the rest of the group. Lucky Luke’s
status at school does not increase simply because,
unbeknownst to anyone, he has won the lottery and is
prepared to shower riches on his friends. People must
know this fact in order for his wealth to attract special
consideration. Moreover, this fact must be not just
known by all but (approximately) common knowledge
(people know that everyone knows it, know that every-
one knows everyone knows it, and so on). If he pri-
vately tells each person at school about his winnings but
swears everyone to secrecy, then his wealth will attract
special consideration, but everyone will falsely believe
everyone else regards him in the same light they did
before his turn of good luck. His social status within the
group will remain the same.
Second, what seems to matter for one’s status is not
just how attributes like wealth, race, lineage, and so on
can attract differential consideration, but how they can
create incentives for differential consideration. Small
children have attributes that “attract” special solicitude
from adults, such as when adults indulge the whims of a
small child because they find him charming and amus-
ing. In this case the child’s special treatment indicates
nothing about his social status. But suppose the same
behavior in adults springs from a different motive: if the
child is the heir to the throne, then adults might try to
curry favor not because of the child’s charms but rather
because of the material benefits he can bestow upon
themwhen he becomes king. Apart from thesematerial
benefits, people will also be incentivized to give the heir
special consideration because of the costs of violating
the social norms and expectations that define the insti-
tution of the monarchy. More generally, the status that
attaches to occupancy of certain social positions or
membership in privileged social groups (e.g., those
defined by gender, race, etc.) is constituted, in part,
by the fact that people have incentives to adhere to the
social norms prescribing preferential treatment for the
members of these groups. The costs of violating social
norms are not always the relevant incentive, however.
Some attributes like wealth and (as I will argue) arbi-
trary power can be distinct bases for unequal status
independently of themechanism involving social norms
(although their incentivizing effects will of course still
be contingent on background social structures—for
example, markets or structures of trade in the case of
wealth).
It is worth emphasizing that on this account, differ-
ences in status do not disappear just by people deciding
to treat each other differently, such as treating each
other in the manner one would expect social equals to
treat each other. If the social structures in light of which
an attribute produces incentives for special consider-
ation remain in place, differences in that attribute still
imply, all else being equal, differences in status. In a
feudal society, the lord and his servantmight be friends,
and theymight be committed to treating each other as if
they were social equals, for they might (correctly)
regard each other as moral equals—that is, as persons
whose fundamental interests and rights have the same
moral importance. But so long as membership in the
feudal categories creates, for them and for others,
commonly recognized incentives for differential treat-
ment, the social hierarchy remains.9
Consider now the significance of arbitrary versus
constrained power in light of this account. My claim is
that unequal arbitrary power, but not unequal power
per se, is a basis for unequal status. I add caveats and
clarifications below, but consider, first, how the given
examples support the claim. When the manager in
Workers’ cooperative is choosing which of two cow-
orkers to promote to a coveted position, her incentives
are powerful enough to create a common expectation
that she will decide according to the prescribed criteria,
giving the position towhichever of the two candidates is
most qualified, independently of her personal feelings
toward them, her own values and preferences, and any
personal benefits she might derive from one or the
other decision. Thus the candidates have no incentives
to ingratiate themselves with her or to flatter her out of
a worry that her feelings toward them will affect her
decision.10 Shemight prefer for positions to be awarded
on the basis of experiences or skills distinct from those
that the prescribed criteria designate as qualifications,
9 This is not to deny that if enough people consistently treat each
other as if they were social equals, then a possible effect might
eventually be the elimination of the social hierarchy. This could
happen if the incentives for differential treatment arise from social
norms and expectations for how one ought to behave and if the norms
erode as deviations from them accumulate.
10 That is, they do not have any such incentives just in virtue of the
manager’s special power to influence these decisions; she could have
other attributes that incentivize this kind of special consideration of
course.

























































































































but the candidates have no incentives to learn about her
preferences or to adjust their behavior in light of them.
Because her special power to influence decisions, being
adequately constrained, does not create commonly
recognized incentives for other people to give her
special consideration, it is not a basis for unequal social
status.
The conclusion would be different if her power were
not constrained in the same way, however. Suppose the
accountability mechanism is imperfect in that the pen-
alty for deviating from the criteria is less severe than the
loss of her job and the probability her reviewers would
spot deviations is low. Because the constraint on her
power is now trivial, other workers may reasonably
wonder whether her decisions will be based on the
prescribed criteria or instead her personal feelings
toward her colleagues, her moral values, or her idio-
syncratic opinions and preferences. Now it pays to learn
which skills and traits she thinks are important for
whoever occupies the coveted role; interested candi-
dates have incentives to take note of her preferences
and acquire those skills. Now her coworkers have
incentives to flatter her, to present themselves in a
positive light, to avoid giving offense. The trivial con-
straints on her power fail to create a common expect-
ation that she will follow an impersonal strategy. Her
power is arbitrary. It creates incentives for the other
workers to give her feelings and wishes special consid-
eration, and the shared awareness of this dynamic is
what constitutes her elevated status.
Such incentives arise when some have greater arbi-
trary power than others even if everyone has, strictly
speaking, the same amount of power simpliciter. In
Voter persecution, all voters may have the same amount
of power to influence election outcomes, but political
parties will have stronger incentives to consider the
opinions and preferences of those voters whose power
to influence the election outcome is arbitrary, being
unconstrained by fear of retribution. Political parties
will have incentives to flatter these voters, to affirm the
importance of their interests and concerns and the
legitimacy of their claims on society, because these
are the voters who can be expected to turn out to vote
if they prefer one party to the other and whose prefer-
ences over the outcomewill matter. Political parties will
have little or no incentive to consider the opinions and
preferences of persecuted voters, for there is a common
expectation that they will choose to stay home what-
ever their political opinions and preferences happen to
be, given that they are constrained to choose between
exercising their right to vote and keeping themselves
safe. The parties and anyone else with a stake in the
election can afford to ignore them. Moreover, the fact
that political parties can afford to ignore the persecuted
voters but have incentives to flatter and give special
consideration to the voters whose power to influence
elections is unconstrained will not be a secret. It will be
plain to all, indeed as good as common knowledge,
which is why the unequal distribution of unconstrained
political power among the voters is the basis for a
difference in status.
This account of social inequality and arbitrary power
generates a simple rebuttal to Brennan’s (2016) argu-
ment that if democratic rights have implications for a
person’s social status, it is only in certain times and
places where a history imbues these rights with cultural
significance, much as the action of raising the middle
finger is insulting only in the right cultural context. The
preceding explanation for why inequalities in arbitrary
power have implications for status does not rest on any
claim about what political rights express or symbolize.
It is the incentives that a system of democratic rights
creates, not the egalitarian values that society’s support
for such rights expresses, that explains their connection
with equal status.
The account also explains why a regime like electoral
epistocracy would violate the requirements for social
equality even if the enfranchised voters weremotivated
to treat their disenfranchised counterparts as moral
equals, giving careful consideration to their interests
and judgments (elicited through opinion surveys, say).
As noted above, the lord and his servant do not become
social equals just because the lord, motivated by an
egalitarian ethos, gives careful consideration to the
interests and judgments of the servant. Inequalities in
arbitrary power to influence political decisions create
commonly recognized incentives for differential treat-
ment. If those incentive structures remain intact, then
so do differences in social status, however considerate
the powerful might be of their social inferiors.
Let me add some qualifications to the claim about
arbitrary power and status. I assume we are dealing
with arbitrary power to influence decisions in which
each member of a reference group potentially has
something at stake. That I have arbitrary power to
influence a decision about the color that my bedroom
walls are painted, but you do not, is not a basis for an
inequality in status between us: the decision does not
concern you, somy power does not create incentives for
you to give me special consideration. There is more to
say about the relevant condition, but however we flesh
it out, by their nature political decisions are sure to
satisfy it.
For a person’s arbitrary power to be a basis for
status, the members of the reference group must be
aware of it, and this situation must persist long enough
for them to be able to engage in the kinds of behaviors
that amount to giving this person special consider-
ation. Viehoff gives an example in which a member
of an egalitarian nomadic tribe stumbles into a pos-
ition where he alone can negotiate an agreement with
another tribe (Viehoff 2019, 20). That he has more
arbitrary power to influence this agreement than the
other tribe members will not create incentives for
anyone to give him special consideration, and thus it
need not have any implications for his status, because
no one is even aware hewill acquire this power prior to
the time when he exercises it. Like the previous quali-
fication, this one does not significantly limit the argu-
ment’s applicability to politics, where the structures
affecting the distribution of arbitrary power are gen-


























































































































Finally, a point to bear in mind when assessing the
claim against putative counterexamples is that there is
more than one basis for unequal status—not just arbi-
trary power to influence collective decisions but other
attributes like wealth, beauty, etc. That one person can
have more arbitrary power to influence a collective
decision than a second yet nonetheless be of lower
status, does not discredit the claim because the two
may differ with respect to the other bases for status. For
the same reason, equality of arbitrary power is insuffi-
cient for social equality.11
Having seen the importance of distinguishing
between constrained and unconstrained power, we
are now in a better position to see how the value of




Recall now the structure of the dialectic prompting the
inquiry into the relationship between political power
and social equality. Some relational-egalitarian justifi-
cations of democracy appeal to the value of egalitarian
power relations and claim democracy, and only dem-
ocracy, distributes political power equally, at least
under ideal conditions. This equality is held to be
necessary for the achievement of social equality, which
is therefore taken to be a reason to value democracy.
The skeptic objects that representative democracy does
not distribute political power equally; in fact, equalizing
political power would destroy representative govern-
ment (Dworkin 2002, 191). Not only is inequality of
political power inherent in the concept of representa-
tive democracy, but, the skeptic continues, representa-
tive democracy also fares no better than certain
nondemocratic alternatives, such as political meritoc-
racy, when evaluated against the putative ideal of equal
political power because in both regimes a select few
exercise power over everyone else. The perspective of
our imagined interlocutor is familiar from a strain of
democratic theory that describes electoral democracy
not as a political system without rulers and subjects but
as just a particular way of selecting who will rule over
everyone else (Dunn 1999; Landa and Pevnick 2020;
Riker 1982; Schumpeter 1942).
I argued that what is necessary for social equality is
not equal political power per se but rather equality in
the distribution of arbitrary power to influence political
decisions. Reconstructing the relational-egalitarian jus-
tification of democracy along these lines, the claim
would be that democracy comes closer to equalizing
the distribution of arbitrary power to influence political
decisions than nondemocratic alternatives, under real-
istic, nonideal conditions. Ideally, democratic officials
would have no arbitrary power and all citizens would
have the same arbitrary power to influence elections,
fulfilling the requirements that the ideal of social equal-
ity imposes on the distribution of arbitrary power. In
this ideal world, elected officials would not properly be
described as “rulers” at all—rulers can exercise power
according to their arbitrary whims. If elected officials
were not just adequately constrained but, moreover,
constrained to use their power for publicly defensible
ends, they could accurately be described as public
servants rather than rulers; those subject to the laws
they enact would have “the status of citizens, not
subjects” (cf. Anderson 2009, 215; Kolodny 2014, 318).
This justification does not invite the same skeptical
objection as the original. The first point to make is that
an unequal distribution of arbitrary power is not a
consequence of constitutive features of representative
democracy—equalizing arbitrary power would not
“destroy” representative government. The explanation
was already foreshadowed in the discussion ofWorkers’
cooperative, where the manager acts as a kind of rep-
resentative, but with adequately constrained power to
influence collective decisions at the firm. In principle, it
is possible that democratic representatives face similar
constraints on their exercise of power, such that there is
a common expectation that they will adopt impersonal
strategies in which their actions are independent of
their own preferences, feelings, and whims.
One possibility is that an elected official is con-
strained to do what his constituents want him to do. If
winning reelection is valuable enough and deviating
from what his constituents want is a sufficiently reliable
means of losing the next election, then there may be a
common expectation that the elected official will follow
a strategy of doing whatever the constituents want.12
Voters’ policy preferences are not the only potential
source of constraint, however. Suppose voters engage
in retrospective voting, ignoring the specific actions an
elected official has taken but holding the official
accountable for outcomes associated with good gov-
ernance such as material prosperity, domestic stability,
etc. (Fiorina 1981; for a review of related literature, see
Ashworth 2012). The representative may therefore
ignore constituent opinion about specific policy deci-
sions, choosing whichever actions he believes will lead
to the outcomes associated with good governance. If
the electoral incentives are strong enough, there may
be a common expectation he will follow an impersonal
strategy of this kind, in which his own policy prefer-
ences and political values play no role in his decision
making. In either of these hypothetical scenarios, the
elected official’s power would be adequately con-
strained. While these are stylized models of electoral
democracy, and in some respects quite unrealistic, they
11 Garrau and Laborde (2015) and Schuppert (2015), arguing that
nondomination is insufficient for social equality, make points that are
relevant here.
12 As this example illustrates, the constraints on an elected represen-
tative’s power might suffice for the purpose of social equality, even if
they are undesirable from other points of view. Indeed, all kinds of
constraints could suffice for the purpose of social equality, on my
account, even constraints that are morally objectionable or conflict
with other democratic values, apart from social equality. Social
equality is not the only value that should inform the design of
democratic institutions.

























































































































nonetheless show that inequalities in arbitrary power
are not necessary consequences of the constitutive
features of representative democracy.
That claim is compatible with other models of rep-
resentation, including the view that representatives
ought to act as a kind of “trustee,” making decisions
based on their own judgments about what promotes the
public interest.13 Indeed, anyone who holds the trustee
view should also favor institutions and norms that
create strong incentives for elected officials to act as
trustees rather than choosing plans of action that
advance their own personal agendas. If the incentives
are strong enough to create a common expectation that
the elected official will act as a trustee—supporting
decisions if and only if, in their sincere judgment, the
decision advances the common interest—then all the
better, and in that case the representative’s power is
adequately constrained. Like the manager in Workers’
cooperative, the trustee follows an impersonal strategy
of making whatever decisions are best according to
certain criteria—in this case, the public good—inde-
pendently of their personal feelings, preferences, and
interests. As Pitkin points out, to call a representative a
“trustee” is to emphasize that he “is not just a person
doing whatever he pleases or acting just for himself,”
but rather has an “obligation to others” (Pitkin 1967,
128). Just as we try to design laws that compel financial
fiduciaries to honor their obligations to clients, so we
may also hope to design democratic institutions and
foster norms that, as far as possible, compel elected
representatives to carry out their obligations as con-
stituents’ trustees.
Even if inequalities in arbitrary power are not inher-
ent in the concept of representative democracy, they
may still be inevitable under realistic conditions. Elec-
tions are an imperfect mechanism of accountability.
The link between the elected official’s actions and the
threatened sanction of removal from office is not so
reliable as what was stipulated, for the purposes of
clarifying concepts, in Workers’ cooperative. The rep-
resentative may reasonably believe that acting as a
good custodian of his constituents’ interests is likely
to leave him, at reelection time, with nearly the same
observable record as acting according to his personal
whims and idiosyncratic policy preferences. Voters’
threat of retrospectively conditioning their votes on
observed past performance would then fail to constrain
the representative. There is arguably room for improv-
ing existing forms of representative democracy, and
strengthening accountability in particular, but there
are limits. A skeptic may therefore question whether
the value of equalizing arbitrary power gives us any
reason to prefer representative democracy to nonde-
mocratic alternatives, like political meritocracy, under
realistic conditions.
To strengthen the objection, the skeptic might also
note that a political meritocracy could avail itself of
nonelectoral mechanisms for constraining the power of
public officials, however imperfectly. These might
include nonelectoral mechanisms, like the norms and
incentives sustaining the rule of law, that would also
have tobe part of the explanation for how representative
democracies flatten the distribution of arbitrary political
power under realistic conditions to the extent they
do. Think of a judge who, appointed for life, is not
formally accountable to anyone for her rulings but
who (let us suppose for the sake of argument) nonethe-
less has incentives to decide cases according to her
sincere judgments about what the law requires. These
incentives may derive from a concern with her reputa-
tion and from the knowledge that deviating from the
plan of deciding according to her sincere judgment will
produce poorly justified decisions and harm her reputa-
tion. If she has no conflicts of interest, then the incentives
could be strong enough to produce a common expect-
ation that she will follow that impersonal strategy. She
would have no more arbitrary power to influence the
outcome of the case than anyone else. If one accepts the
arguments in the previous section, then her holding the
role of judge need not prevent her and other citizens—
say the plaintiff in the case—from relating to each other
as social equals. Of course in practice this may rarely be
true; I amnot offering this as a realistic description of the
position of judges in actual regimes, democratic or
otherwise. The point is only to highlight a conceptual
possibility to which the reconstructed version of the
relational-egalitarian argument would have to attend:
an actor’s power can be constrained even if they are not,
strictly speaking, accountable to any particular person
for its exercise.14 A comparative justification of repre-
sentative democracy would thus have to consider
whether this and other nonelectoral mechanisms might
work to constrain power in a political meritocracy.
It would also require a more nuanced measure of
arbitrary power than what I have given, one that allows
meaningful comparisons between the amounts of arbi-
trary power public officials have in different types of
regime. The analysis I have given supports binary
judgments: power is either adequately constrained, if
the constraint produces a common expectation that
power will be exercised according to an impersonal
strategy, or it is arbitrary. A more nuanced view is
suggested by a more realistic variation on Workers’
cooperative, where the manager’s incentives to exercise
power only according to the prescribed criteria are
13 The claim is also compatible with Beerbohm’s (2012, chap. 8)
model of “principled representation,” provided it is possible to create
incentives for representatives to treat their constituents’ judgments
about principles of justice as exclusionary reasons in their deliber-
ations, as he argues they ought. What I say here does not apply to all
theories of representation, however. In whatMansbridge (2003) calls
“gyroscopic” representation, the elected representative is not sup-
posed to be responsive to external incentives and is not supposed to
be accountable to voters in any traditional sense. It may be that so-
called gyroscopic representation implies what I refer to as arbitrary
power.
14 This example also illustrates how an actor’s power can be con-
strained even if the actor is not under any person’s or group’s control.
This is one reason I prefer the explanation given here to Lovett’s
(2021) explanation of why representative democracy is compatible



























































































































weaker but still significant. In more realistic versions of
the story, the manager’s incentives might create a
common expectation that she will exercise power
according to a strategy that is not “impersonal,” as
defined above, but partially depersonalized, as it were:
one in which her personal feelings, preferences, and
values exert some influence on her decisionmaking, yet
less influence than they might in the absence of the
imperfect accountability mechanism. We might then
say that she has more or less arbitrary power, or is
constrained to amore or less significant extent, depend-
ing on how closely her situation approximates the ideal
type of the adequately constrained agent. This imper-
fectly constrained power would still create incentives
for other people to give the agent’s feelings, prefer-
ences, and interests special consideration. But the
incentives would be weaker or stronger depending on
the significance of the constraints and how much influ-
ence these attitudes and motivations are expected to
have on the agent’s exercise of power. Plausibly, the
influence on inequalities in social status would be more
or less depending on the strength of these incentives.
Amending the account of arbitrary power in the
manner suggested, we might then compare representa-
tive democracy with an alternative regime like political
meritocracy by comparing the extent to which the
personal feelings, preferences, and interests of imper-
fectly constrained public officials can be expected to
influence collective decisions in the twokinds of regime.
Under realistic conditions, the constraints on demo-
cratic officials may be weak enough that they would
be expected to exercise power according to strategies
that are only partially “depersonalized.” The same will
no doubt be true of public officials in any regime.
However, one might conjecture that the typical institu-
tions and political cultures of representative democra-
cies still workmore effectively to constrain the power of
high-level public officials than nondemocratic alterna-
tives, rendering the personal whims, preferences, and
interests of the first set of actors less consequential for
political decisions. For example, in a political meritoc-
racy, low-level officials can be held accountable to
officials higher up in the hierarchy, but at the top there
are actors who are accountable to no one and who will
be only imperfectly constrained by political norms.
Compared with their counterparts in democracies,
who are constrained by norms as well as electoral
accountability mechanisms, one might conjecture that
the preferences and interests of high-ranking officials in
a political meritocracy could be expected to play amore
consequential role in their exercise of power. Com-
pared with democracy’s elected officials, they are, one
might argue, more aptly described as a “ruling elite.” If
this conjecture were born out, then the value of social
equality would be a consideration favoring representa-
tive democracy over political meritocracy.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by drawing out the implications of the
argument for questions about voting rights. On the
account I have proposed, social equality requires an
equal distribution of arbitrary power to influence pol-
itical decisions. Logically speaking, that requirement
could be met if no one had any arbitrary power. That is
not how representative democracy would meet it, how-
ever. Even under ideal conditions, democratic voters
would have arbitrary power to influence elections;
there would be no constraints on their power producing
a common expectation that they will exercise it accord-
ing to impersonal strategies, strategies in which their
preferences, values, and interests play no role. Indeed,
to apply such constraints, even impartially and equally,
would undermine the point of democratic elections as
many people understand them. What representative
democracy requires is not the absence of arbitrary
power but the absence of inequalities in arbitrary
power. Public officials who have more power to influ-
ence political decisions than ordinary citizens ought to
be adequately constrained through norms, laws, elect-
oral accountability, and other mechanisms. Ideally, all
adult citizens ought to have the same amount of arbi-
trary power to influence elections.15
Somemodes of compromising democracy unambigu-
ously violate that principle, such as when marginalized
social groups are excluded from the electorate or when
the wealthy are effectively able to purchase extra pol-
itical influence on top of the power everyone enjoys in
virtue of basic democratic rights. But even if all citizens
have the same amount of power to influence elections,
the principle can still be violated if laws, institutions, or
social practices make the exercise of that power espe-
cially burdensome for some citizens. The hypothetical
example of voter persecution was a stylized and
extreme illustration of the point. Another example
might be certain voter identification laws. In the U.S.,
a concern with such laws is that the requirement might
disproportionately burden racial minorities and there-
fore depress their turnout in elections—which is, plaus-
ibly, the purpose of the state legislatures that enact
these requirements: for example, in Texas, “hunting
and gun permits, which Whites are statistically more
likely to possess, are legitimate forms of ID but social
service cards, more often held by Blacks and Latinos,
are not” (Barreto et al. 2019). These laws are often
described as “disempowering” minority voters, but a
more precise description is that they make it more
costly for minority voters to exercise their power. They
impose extra constraints on the power of citizens who
do not already have the required identification: these
15 This view of democracy is similar to the account Landauer (2019)
finds in classical Greek discussions of democracy, according to which
ordinary citizens, in their capacity as jurors and voters, were not to be
held accountable for their actions even as great importance was
placed on mechanisms for holding political elites accountable, espe-
cially orators advising the people in the assembly. One difference
between the two conceptions of democracy is that while the distinc-
tion between unaccountable and accountable political actors may
correlate in practice with the distinction between unconstrained and
constrained power, the two distinctions are not equivalent. See the
example, above, of the judge who is not accountable to any agent or
group of agents but whose power is nevertheless constrained.

























































































































citizens are forced to choose between exercising their
right to vote and whatever theymust forego, in terms of
time and money, to acquire the needed identification.
The additional constraint threatens to create an expect-
ation, shared by political parties, that they will follow
“impersonal” or partially depersonalized strategies in
which they abstain from participating in the election
independently of their preferences over the candidates.
They would then have less arbitrary power to influence
election outcomes than voters who do not face the same
constraint and whose attitudes toward the candidates
aremore likely to influence whether and how they vote.
This difference in arbitrary powerwould be expected to
shape political parties’ incentives to give consideration
to the preferences of minority voters, as compared with
white voters, exacerbating the differences in social
status that already exist on account of differences in
wealth, education, racial stigmatization, etc.
The argument of the paper thus shows not only how
one can reconcile the value of social equality with the
inequality in political power between elected represen-
tatives and ordinary citizens and how it can play a role
in the justification of representative democracy over
alternatives like political meritocracy. It also shows
how this value can inform normative debates about
the design of democratic institutions. Laws and policies
that impose targeted burdens on select groups of citi-
zens, increasing their costs of exercising political power,
frustrate progress toward the ideal of social equality.
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